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FAMILY LAW- OUGHT A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE BE
DIVISIBLE AS PROPERTY UPON DIVORCE?
In recent years the law governing marriage and divorce has
changed dramatically In both common law and community prop-
erty jurisdictions courts are beginning to view marriage not as a
union of the participants but as a partnership of equals.1 The prev-
alence of no-fault divorce statutes allows courts to focus their at-
tention on the financial incidents of marital dissolution rather than
on the disputes over fault grounds for divorce that previously occu-
pied much of the courts' time, even though many states have
mixed fault and no-fault statutes. The wife has lost alimony bar-
gaining power that she traditionally possessed in fault litigation;
legislatures, and subsequently the courts, have used alimony
awards and property division to provide for the actual needs of the
parties rather than to punish the offending spouse.2 Courts have
become innovators seeking to use their dissolution authority to di-
vide a wider range of property than many heretofore thought the
courts had authority to divide.3 Courts frequently make property
divisions based on a notion that treats the marital relationship as a
de facto economic partnership in which the partners share the ben-
efits, burdens, and responsibilities of marriage.4
One problem that has received special attention in recent years
1. See Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo.
L. RE V. 165 (1976); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to An Inef-
fective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Murphy, The Implied
Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property
Distribution, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 221 (1974).
2. See notes 195-199 & accompanying text infra. But see In re Marriage of Vanet, 544
S.W.2d 236, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (wife who supported family while husband was in
graduate school awarded alimony based on husband's future earning ability notwithstanding
difficulty of valung wife's contribution). See also Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the
Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wlis. L. REV.
947, 959-960; Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession
as Marital Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677, 681-84 (1979).
3. For example, some courts routinely divide assets such as goodwill, the value of an ongo-
ing professional practice, and both vested and nonvested pension and retirement benefits.
See notes 155-182 & accompanying text infra.
4. See Krauskopf, supra note 1; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 1; Murphy, supra note
1.
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is whether an advanced professional degree constitutes a divisible
property interest upon marital dissolution.' This Note analyzes
whether an advanced degree constitutes a divisible property inter-
est by focusing on two issues: first, whether a degree or license is
property;6 second, if a degree or license is property, whether that
property is divisible."
The problem arises when one spouse, traditionally the wife,8
supports the other spouse during a professional graduate program;
shortly after the nonworking spouse earns a degree or completes
required postgraduate training, the marriage dissolves. Dissolution
under these circumstances creates problems for the court that at-
tempts to adjudicate the economic rights of the parties; without
fault-based alimony criteria, the court effectively may deny the
supporting spouse a remedy If the working spouse supported the
couple throughout the marriage, she is therefore capable of self-
support. The working spouse, consequently, cannot receive ali-
mony in many jurisdictions.9 Furthermore, often the only valuable
asset which the married couple acquires during the marriage is the
nonworking spouse's educational degree. The couple dissipates the
marital earnings and savings to support the family and to meet the
student spouse's educational expenses. Often during the early
years of marriage, the couple seeks through a partnership effort to
acquire a professional education for one spouse, thereby delaying
5. E.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885
(Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.
App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); DeWitt v.
DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
This Note addresses solely the consideration of the attainment of a graduate professional
degree as opposed to an undergraduate degree. An undergraduate education usually ad-
dresses the comprehension of liberal arts and sciences rather than the attainment of a pro-
fession. Furthermore, one is more likely to seek a graduate education during the time in life
when marriage is more common and the spouses are more likely to view education in terms
of future earning ability. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional
Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590, 591 n.5 (1974).
6. See notes 138-147 & accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 148-154 & accompanying text infra.
8. Although some husbands support their wives during school, the writer's research has
yet to reveal a single case in which the husband sues the wife for division of her degree as
marital property. Consequently, the word "he" is used to denote the student spouse, and
"she" is used to denote the working spouse.
9. See notes 195-199 & accompanying text infra.
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other major investments. Thus, the economic benefits of occupa-
tional preparation have not accrued at the time the parties divorce.
Under certain circumstances, fairness compels inclusion as a di-
visible marital property asset of that portion of one spouse's earn-
ing power acquired through the partnership endeavor. Several
courts have treated a professional degree as a marital asset; this
Note seeks to examine the solutions and nonsolutions proposed by
the courts in the context of existing remedies and statutes.
This Note contends that to allow a court to classify an advanced
educational degree or license as marital property subject to divi-
sion upon divorce is both reasonable and necessary Furthermore,
the classification of a professional degree as a property asset, dis-
tributable upon dissolution of marriage, is the only feasible, widely
available remedy when the parties, for whatever reasons, end the
marriage without other divisible marital assets. If through the
working spouse's effort the degreed spouse becomes unjustly en-
riched, the courts as a matter of equity must value and distribute
the professional degree as a marital asset.10
KINDS OF PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION STATUTES
Each state has a unique scheme of postdissolution marital prop-
erty distribution. In the United States, distribution statutes fall
into three distinct classes: strict common law, equitable distribu-
tion, and community property. Understanding the classification of
an asset as divisible property requires an examination of each cate-
gory of distribution statute.
10. For purposes of deciding what to classify as the "thing" to be divided, the courts have
not clarified the distinction between a professional license and increased earning capacity.
The distinction largely is semantic and for the purposes of this Note does not affect the
outcome of the cases. E.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969)
(law degree not community property); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978) (educational degree is not marital property); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (future earning capacity of husband's law degree is marital prop-
erty); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (license to practice dentistry is
marital property). See also Comment, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Mar-
riage Dissolutions, 64 IowA L. REv. 705, 710-12 (1979); 1979 WASH. U.L.Q 1175, 1177 (1979).
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Strict Common Law
Five jurisdictions follow the strict common law rule." These ju-
risdictions give the court no power to distribute the separate prop-
erty of the spouses; instead, distribution is a function of title
alone.'2 Some strict common law jurisdictions give the courts lim-
ited authority to distribute property according to special equities. 3
Because of the commingling of property occurring during the
marital partnership, courts following the common law approach
must decide the true ownership of each property asset. The court's
jurisdiction over the matter, however, ends when the court deter-
mines to which spouse the property belongs."4 The argument that
an educational degree is marital property subject to division by the
court upon divorce is inapplicable in the five jurisdictions that fol-
low the strict common law rule because those states do not allow
equitable distribution of property under any circumstances. Such
an award is possible, reasonable, and necessary under equitable
distribution and community property distribution statutes. 5
Eqitable Distributin
The most common modern form of property distribution juris-
11. These states are Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See
Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1980, 6 FAM. L.
REP. 4043 (1980).
Recent court decisions in both South Carolina and Florida, however, cast doubt on the
view that these two states are strict common law jurisdictions. See Canakaris v. Canakaris,
382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 6 FAM. L. REP. 2671 (S.C. May 6, 1980). Many practitioners consider as a
consequence of these decisions that South Carolina and Florida are now equitable distribu-
tion jurisdictions. See Freed & Foster, supra, at 1051. See generally note 16 & accompany-
ing text infra. Pennsylvania and New York, two states that traditionally have followed the
strict common law rule have changed recently to an equitable distribution rule. Act of June
19, 1980, ch. 281, § 9, 1980 N.Y. Laws 445, 448 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980)); Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, § 401(d), 1980 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 49, 56 (to be codified at Pa. Cons. Stat. § 401(d)).
12. Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 4051.
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 367 So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Wilson v.
Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
14. See Erickson, Spousal Support Towards the Realization of Educational Goals: How
the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 961.
15. See notes 133-137 & accompanying text infra.
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diction in the United States is the equitable distribution system.16
Thirty-eight jurisdictions grant judicial authority to distribute
some or all of the property owned by the parties'at the time of
divorce according to standards set forth in the applicable statute.17
The distribution statutes in these jurisdictions do not specify the
exact proportion of marital property a court must award to each
spouse. The courts thus possess wide discretion to distribute prop-
erty in accordance with broad notions of fairness and the facts of
each case.'8 Statutes in some jurisdictions provide only that courts
award property in a "just" and "equitable" manner, whereas
others specify certain criteria that the court should consider when
distributing property between divorcing partners.'9
16. Thirty-eight jurisdictions distribute according to an equitable distribution system: Al-
abama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Freed & Foster, supra
note 11, at 4032-33. See also note 11 supra.
17. The court's power of distribution generally relates only to those assets acquired by the
parties during marriage. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 450-51 (1968).
18. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1980).
19. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West Supp. 1980). Among the more common
criteria used by the court are: contributions of a spouse to the marriage; marital assets and
the relative financial condition of the spouses; duration of marriage; age, health and circum-
stances of the parties; amount and source of income; and standard of living. Freed & Foster,
supra note 11, at 4033.
Section 401(d) of the 1980 PA. DIVORCE CODE provides:
In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall upon request of
either party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property be-
tween the parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as
the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medi-
cal, retirement, insurance and other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preserva-
tion, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contri-
bution of a party as homemaker.
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Moreover, several states have adopted provisions identical or
similar to section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA), which contains two alternative versions.20 Alternative A
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective.
Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, § 401(d), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 49, 56 (to be codified at 23
PA. CONS. STAT. § 401(d)).
20. Section 307 of the UMDA provides:
§307 Alternative A:
(a) in a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or disposi-
tion of property following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or
lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without regard to mar-
ital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, finally eq-
uitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to ei-
ther or both however and whenever acquired, and whether the title thereto is
in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making apportionment the
court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either
party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupa-
tion, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, lia-
bilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the ap-
portionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, pres-
ervation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and
the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
(b) In a proceeding, the court may protect and promote the best interests of
the children by setting aside a portion of the jointly and separately held es-
tates of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance,
education, and general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent chil-
dren of the parties.
Alternative B:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, or disposi-
tion of property following a decree of dissolution of the marriage or legal sepa-
ration by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or
lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each
spouse's separate property to that spouse. It also shall divide community prop-
erty, without regard to marital misconduct, in just proportions after consider-
ing all relevant factors including:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, includ-
ing contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or
the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of
522
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conforms to practice in equitable distribution jurisdictions; alter-
native B conforms to practice in community property jurisdictions.
The UMDA, section 307 m particular, has as its primary goal the
elimination of any consideration of fault or wrongdoing by one of
the married partners in the various determinations made by the
court. 1 Evident throughout the UMDA is an attempt to reduce
the adversary nature of marital litigation.22 The Act endeavors to
make the distribution of assets upon the dissolution of marriage
similar to the distribution of assets at the dissolution of a business
partnership.23
Community Property
Under a community property system,24 ownership of all property
acquired during the marriage, with certain exceptions, vests imme-
diately in the marital community 2 Each spouse is capable of own-
ing separate property as well as community property For example,
property owned separately by each spouse before marriage contin-
ues to be owned separately after marriage. If, however, the indus-
try, labor, or property of the marital community has contributed
substantially to an increase in the value of the separate property, a
court will consider as community property the increase in value of
the separate property 26
any children.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (emphasis supplied).
Connecticut, Delaware, and Montana have provisions similar or identical to Alternative A.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466-481 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 15
(1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-4-202 (1980). Colorado, Kentucky, Missouri, and
Washington have provisions similar or Identical to Alternative B. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-
10-113 (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330
(Vernon 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1979).
21. See Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REV. 559 (1973).
22. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, Commissioner's Prefatory Note.
23. Id. See Note, supra note 21, at 560-61.
24. The nine community property jurisdictions are: Puerto Rico, Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Freed & Foster, supra note
11, at 4032.
25. Although during marriage one spouse may have no realistic control over the property,
upon divorce, he or she is assured of a one-half interest in the property, subject to equitable
considerations in most jurisdictions. See generally W DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 60 (2d ed. 1971).
26. Id.
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Community property states differ in their approach to property
division. California, Louisiana, and New Mexico, for example, nor-
mally divide marital property by distributing half of the property
to each spouse.27 The other five community property jurisdictions
permit distribution of property equitably between the parties in
much the same way as do equitable distribution jurisdictions.28
CASE LAW
Few courts have considered whether a professional education, or
the potential for increased earning ability, should be recognized as
an asset with a quantifiable value for the purpose of division as
property between the parties upon divorce.2 9 Most of the early
cases that discuss the issue, decided before In re Marriage of Gra-
ham30 in 1978, hold that neither the degree nor the increased earn-
ing potential generated by the degree are property 31 Several cases,
particularly those decided after Graham, hold that either the edu-
cation or the future earning power that it represents constitute an
asset subject to division as property upon dissolution. 2 Each case
demonstrates one court's unique way of dealing with the problems
engendered in the consideration of whether a professional degree
or license can be considered marital property With the exception
of Graham, the outcome of each case from a factual standpoint
reflects a measure of justice given to both parties. From a legal
standpoint, however, many of the cases establish unjust, untenable
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1979); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2406 (West 1971); N. M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978).
28. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25.318 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.150; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.080 (1979). See also notes 19-26 & accompanying text supra.
29. E.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885
(Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J.
340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Daniels v. Dan-
iels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961). See also Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App.
2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945).
30. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
31. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J.
340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). But see Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773
(1961).
32. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
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precedents. Courts dealing with unique fact settings often promul-
gate an across-the-board rule of law that does justice between the
litigants in the instant case, but creates a potential for injustice in
many situations not foreseen by the court.
Todd v Todd
The California Court of Appeals first expressed the view that a
professional education fails to constitute a divisible asset upon
marital dissolution in Todd v. Todd.3 3 The Todds married in 1947
and separated in 1964. Mrs. Todd, the plaintiff, worked to support
the family while her husband obtained undergraduate and law de-
grees.3 4 She contended that because her husband's education was
financed in large part with community funds, her husband's educa-
tion constituted a community asset with substantial value that the
court ought to divide between the parties upon divorce .3 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals rejected Mrs. Todd's argument, holding:
"If a spouse's education preparing him for the practice of law can
be said to be 'community property,' a proposition which is ex-
tremely doubtful even though the education is acquired with com-
munity monies, it manifestly is of such a character that a monetary
value cannot be placed upon it." 6 The court in Todd, therefore,
considered the husband's degree as at best an intangible property
right incapable of monetary valuation. 7
In the same action, however, the court awarded Mrs. Todd
$111,500 in community assets, while awarding only $89,116.35 in
community assets to the husband. 8 Subsequent opinions citing the
Todd case for doctrinal support in denying a property interest in
the spouse's degree often neglect to mention the larger award to
the wife. 9 The court in Todd acknowledged that the plaintiff real-
ized value from her investment in her husband's education through
the large property division award made to her. Her property award
33. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
34. Id. at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
35. Id. at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
36. Id. at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
37. Id. at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
38. Id. at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
39. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, - , 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978); Stern v.
Stern, 66 N.J. 340, -, 331 A.2d 257, 260 n.3 (1978).
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was obtained as a result of the increased earning capacity that re-
sulted from Mr. Todd's educational degrees, made possible partly
with Mrs. Todd's assistance.40 The court in Todd, therefore, did
not address the typical situation in which the working spouse has
realized nothing on her investment; rather the court considered a
situation in which the spouse has realized on her investment be-
cause she supported her husband during schooling many years
before the divorce. The spouse received a substantial property
award4 1 because the divorce occurred long enough after her contri-
bution for the degree of the husband to have contributed substan-
tially to community assets, and hence, to a larger quantity of prop-
erty to distribute. Thus, the precedential value of the Todd case is
doubtful.
Stern v Stern
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, which decided Stern v.
Stern42 in 1975, reached an outcome similar to that of Todd.
Rather than supporting her husband during professional school, as
is the usual situation in these cases, Mrs. Stern contributed to her
husband's earning capacity by providing him with "connections"
that substantially enhanced his future earning capacity Mrs. Stern
40. 272 Cal. App. 2d at -, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
41. Id. at - , 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
42. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). A recent decision of the New Jersey Superior Court
reveals that the Stern analysis may have limited application. In Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175
N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (Ch. Div. 1980), the Superior Court of Middlesex County
held that the education and degree obtained by the professional spouse constitutes a prop-
erty right subject to equitable offset upon the dissolution of a marriage. The court awarded
Mrs. Mahoney a $5,000 credit, payable in monthly installments of $100, in recognition of
her contributions to the maintenance of the household and the support of her husband
while he attended graduate school.
Judge Rubin relied upon the Iowa Supreme Court holding in In re Marriage of Horst-
mann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), to find that when no substantial assets are available for
judicial distribution, a court may recognize and reward the contributions of the working
spouse to avoid unjust enrichment of the educated spouse. Moreover, the court held that
fairness demanded such a result because "[a] working spouse who contributes to the educa-
tion of another [sic] spouse does so certainly with the expectation that there will be in the
future some benefit derived from such a sacrifice." 175 N.J. Super. at -, 419 A.2d at
1150.
See also Washington Post, Dec. 6, 1980, at A-12, col. 3 (report of similar New Jersey
holding that working spouse of doctor to get 20% of degree valued at $305,000; working
spouse had become deaf).
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was the daughter of a successful attorney who, upon his daughter's
marriage to defendant Milton Stern, had hired the defendant as an
associate in his law office.43 As a result of his entry into his father-
in-law's law firm, Mr. Stern had become a managing partner with
the firm.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the lower court's44
treatment of the defendant's earning capacity as a separate item of
property under the New Jersey property division statute. 45 Like
the court in Todd, the court in Stern held that potential earning
capacity should be only one factor considered by a court in distrib-
uting property and awarding alimony46 The court held that the
degree itself, however, should not be a separate item of property 47
Stern, like Todd, involved a situation in which the degreed
spouse had been out of school for a period of years, had established
a substantial professional practice, and had accumulated numerous
possessions. 48 Furthermore, Mrs. Stem's "contributions" to her
husband's career had not been of the same magnitude as those
made by spouses in other cases examining whether an advanced
educational degree constitutes property subject to division upon
divorce.49
Although affording the litigating parties justice, Stern poten-
tially disserves future litigants by holding that future earning ca-
43. 66 N.J. at -, 331 A.2d at 259-60.
44. S C v. A C, 123 N.J. Super. 566, -, 304 A.2d 202, 204-05 (Ch. Div. 1973) (initials
were used in the lower court case name to protect the anonymity of the parties).
45. 66 N.J. at -, 331 A.2d at 260.
46. Id. at -, 331 A.2d at 260.
47. Id. at -, 331 A.2d at 260.
48. 123 N.J. Super. at -, 304 A.2d at 204. The parties agreed that the plaintiff was to
receive the marital house and furnishings in return for payment to the defendant by the
plaintiff of one-half of the appraised value of the house and furnishings. The court evenly
divided joint bank accounts between the parties.
The lower court, however, deemed the defendant's earnings a divisible property asset be-
cause the defendant owned a 16.9% interest in a lucrative partnership. The court thus
awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in 10 annual installments.
49. In Stern, the wife's contribution to her husband's career was more tenuous than in
most of the cases that raise the issue. The status and position of one spouse's father and the
accompanying relative advantage to the other spouse is not a contribution of the same char-
acter as that of the spouse who sacrifices opportunity and material advantage to aid the
other spouse to attain a degree enhancing his earning power. In one instance, the spouse
contributes by her labor; in the other, she merely brings to the marriage unearned
enrichments.
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pacity cannot be considered property subject to division upon di-
vorce. If the parties to subsequent litigation, unlike the parties in
Stern, have no other assets to divide, such a rule creates injustice
by allowing one spouse to enrich himself by a degree earned at the
expense of both spouses.
In Re Marriage of Graham
In re Marriage of Graham50 was the first appellate court case to
consider whether a professional degree constituted marital prop-
erty capable of division when the parties were divorced shortly af-
ter the nonworking spouse obtained his degree." In Graham the
parties had accumulated no other substantial marital assets be-
sides the degree.5 2 After six years of marriage the Grahams filed a
joint petition seeking marital dissolution. 3 While Mrs. Graham
had been employed throughout the marriage as an airline steward-
ess, her income had provided approximately seventy percent of the
couple's marital income.54 During the marriage, Mr. Graham
worked part-time and obtained both undergraduate and M.B.A.
degrees.55 The only substantial asset the parties acquired during
their marriage was Mr. Graham's graduate degree and the in-
creased future earning potential that the degree represented.5 6
Characterizing her husband's graduate education as a property as-
set under the Colorado divorce and dissolution statute, Mrs. Gra-
ham sought an equitable division of the value of the degree as mar-
ital property 57 Mrs. Graham failed to make a claim for support
50. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). See generally 11 CONN. L. REv. 62 (1978); 13 TULSA
L. J. 646 (1978).
51. 194 Colo. at - , 574 P.2d at 77.
52. Id. at , 574 P.2d at 76.
53. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 77.
54. Id. at , 574 P.2d at 77.
55. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 77.
56. Id. at __, 574 P.2d at 76.
57. An expert witness testified for Mrs. Graham that the discounted present value of Mr.
Graham's M.B.A. degree was $82,836. Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 5, In re Marriage of
Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). The
witness reached this valuation by use of statistical/actuarial data calculating Mr. Graham's
projected lifetime earnings both with and without the degree. The lower court concluded
that the degree earned by Mr. Graham was marital property in which Mrs. Graham had an
interest. The court accordingly found that Mrs. Graham had a 40% interest in the degree
and awarded her $33,134 payable in monthly installments of $100. This percentage was de-
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probably because she could not qualify for an award under the
Colorado support statute,58 which directs the court to award main-
tenance only when the party seeking it cannot "provide for his rea-
sonable needs" and cannot "support himself through appropriate
employment. '5 9 Mrs. Graham was capable of supporting both her-
self and her husband. Under Colorado law, therefore, Mrs. Gra-
ham's only potential hope for receipt of a return on her investment
was through a property division.60
rived through consideration of the following time-oriented factors: (1) Mr. Graham's educa-
tional pursuits were considered full-time employment of 40 hours per week; (2) his part-
time job took about 20 hours per week; and (3) Mrs. Graham's full-time job required 40
hours per week. Thus, Mr. Graham invested 60% of the time in the pursuit of his degree
while Mrs. Graham invested 40%. Id.
58. 194 Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 78-79.
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973).
60. The Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (Cum. Supp.
1979), states:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage the court shall set apart
to each spouse his property without regard to marital misconduct, in such
proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors
including:
(a) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of the spouse as homemaker;
(b) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the divi-
sion of property is to become effective , and
(d) Any increases or decreases in the value of the separate property of
the spouse during the marriage or the depletion of the separate property
for marital purposes.
(2) For purposes of this article only, "marital property" means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
and
- (d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
(3) All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and
prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regard-
less of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of
coownership. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a
showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of
this section.
(4) An asset of a spouse acquired prior to the marriage or in accordance with
subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) of this section shall be considered as marital prop-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Graham's character-
ization of her husband's degree as marital property In a four to
three decision, the court held that the educational degree failed to
come within the legislature's definition of property6' because the
degree lacked many of the characteristics associated with the tradi-
tional notion of property The court stated:
[The degree] does not have an exchange value or any objective
transferable value on the open market. It is personal to the
holder, it terminates on the death of the holder and is not inher-
itable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or
pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education combined with diligence and hard
work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money.
It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially as-
sist in the future acquisition of property. In our view it has none
of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.62
Ignoring the realities of Mrs. Graham's situation, the court rea-
erty, for purposes of this article only, to the extent that its present value ex-
ceeds its value at the time of the marriage or at the time of acquisition if ac-
quired after the marriage.
(5) For purposes of this section only, property shall be valued as of the date
of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of property if such
hearing precedes the date of the decree.
61. The Colorado statute may be broader than interpreted by the Graham majority. The
court noted that previous Colorado case precedent embraced a broad view of property, but
nonetheless took a narrow view of what constitutes property. A broader interpretation is
supported by the legislature's use of the phrase "all property." American Jurisprudence in-
terprets the use of the term to mean:
The words "all property," as used in a statute, contract, or like instrument, are
usually given a very comprehensive construction except where accompanied by
a specific enumeration, in which instance the latter controls and limits such
words; but it has been said that "property" and "all property" are not inter-
changeable terms, and a court is not warranted in substituting one for the
other.
63 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 2, at 289 (1972); see 11 CONN. L. REV. 62, 67 & n.21 (1978).
Moreover, in a recent Colorado decision, Nichols v. Nichols, No. 78-716 (Colo. Ct. App.
March 3, 1980), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that professional goodwill is a marital
property asset capable of division upon dissolution of marriage. This holding may indicate a
willingness on the part of Colorado courts to view the legislative definition of property more
broadly. Of course business goodwill may be a transferable asset. On the other hand, defin-
ing property by transferability only, rather than by its substance, either as a mere res or as
value, reflects a narrow view of the concept of property.
62. 194 Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 77.
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soned that other remedies were available to compensate the work-
ing spouse for any loss that she might have suffered.6 3 The major-
ity held that a court may consider only the working spouse's
contribution to the degreed spouse's education when dividing mar-
ital property or awarding maintenance."' Consequently, contrary to
the view expressed in the court's opinion, Mrs. Graham effectively
was denied a remedy Under the court's restrictive definition of
property, the parties had no marital property to divide. Moreover,
because Mrs. Graham was capable of self-support, she was ineligi-
ble to receive a maintenance award under the Colorado statute.6 5
Justice Carrigan, writing for three justices in dissent, focused
upon the economic realities of the Graham situation. Realizing
that the wife's earnings provided her husband's support and thus
constituted an "investment" in his education, 6 Justice Carrigan
argued that as a matter of equity the court must provide "ex-
traordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice." Instead
of focusing on whether the husband's degree constituted marital
property subject to division, the dissenting opinion considered the
asset at issue to be the increase in the degreed spouse's earning
potential made possible by attainment of the advanced degree.68
The minority found that in the limited circumstances when no
other award is available under the divorce and dissolution statute
to a spouse who contributed to a marital partner's degree, the
spouse may share in the degreed spouse's future bounty Sharing
in the degreed spouse's future bounty, according to the minority, is
analogous to awards in personal injury and wrongful death actions
of anticipated future earnings, discounted to present value, against
a tortfeasor who impairs or destroys another's future earning
capacity 69
The Graham decision is at odds with equitable practice 70 be-
cause the majority allows the plaintiff no return on her investment.
63. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 78.
64. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 78.
65. See note 58 & accompanying text supra.
66. 194 Colo. at _. 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 78-79.
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By narrowly defining property and then determining that an ad-
vanced educational degree fails to fit within that definition, the
majority allows the defendant the windfall of the plaintiff's contri-
bution to his professional education unencumbered by liability to
the contributing spouse.
In Re Marriage of Horstmann
In re Marriage of Horstmann,71 an Iowa Supreme Court case,
involved facts similar to Graham. The Horstmanns married during
their junior year in college.7 2 Mrs. Horstmann, who never finished
her college education, worked as a bank clerk while her husband
attended law school.73 Both Mr. and Mrs. Horstmann's parents
also provided financial assistance during their marriage. 4
Affirming the district court decision, the Iowa Supreme Court
held that the potential for increased earning capacity made possi-
ble by a law degree and certificate of admission to the bar consti-
tuted an asset for distribution by the court.75 Thus, Horstmann
appears to be the first state supreme court decision to recognize
the working spouse's right to a portion of the nonworking spouse's
increased future earning capacity as valuable property 6 upon dis-
solution of marriage.
The court found that the Horstmanns earned and spent the ma-
jority of their assets to allow Mr. Horstmann to complete his legal
education. 7 Moreover, the court noted the couple's significantly
low standard of living because of Mr. Horstmann's status as a full-
time student rather than a full-time employee during the couple's
71. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
72. Id. at 886.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 890.
76. Other courts had recognized the right previously in dicta, but had not made a prop-
erty division on that basis. See, e.g., Darnels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 459, 185 N.E.2d
773, 775 (1961). Still other courts have held that the spouse's contribution to a professional
degree is only a factor to be considered. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
574 P.2d 75 (1978); Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1968); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J.
340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). But see In re Marriage of Vanet, 554 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976).
77. 263 N.W.2d 885, 887-88 (Iowa 1978).
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entire marriage.7 8 According to the court, Mrs. Horstmann sacri-
ficed her education to have the couple's child, supported the family
while her husband was attending school, and received no compan-
ionship or services because her husband had to study long hours
while he attended law school." Finally, the court found that the
couple had accumulated no savings."0
Justice Mason, writing the opinion for a unanimous court,
agreed in principle with Graham and Todd that an educational de-
gree does not constitute a suitable asset for distribution by the
courts upon dissolution of marriage. The court, however, consid-
ered, not the degree itself, but the potential future earning capac-
ity engendered by the degree to constitute the asset subject to divi-
sion.8 1 The Iowa court thus held that the parties had an asset to
divide, affirming the lower court's award of $18,000 property distri-
bution to Mrs. Horstmann because of her contributions and sacri-
fices toward her husband's attainment of a law degree.82
The court in Horstmann cited with approval an Ohio decision,
Daniels v. Daniels.8" In that case, the Ohio Court of Appeals lik-
ened the right to practice medicine to a franchise and thus held
that the license constituted property that a trial court could con-
sider when awarding alimony.8 4 Presumably the court in Daniels, if
unable to award the working spouse alimony, would have awarded
Mrs. Daniels a property interest m her husband's degree because
of the franchise nature of a professional education and practice.8
78. Id. at 890.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 891.
82. The court arrived at the $18,000 figure roughly by adding that portion of the working
spouse's income expended for family needs during the last three years of the marriage,
$15,760, to the sums contributed to the family by the working spouse's parents, $10,939, and
substracting the student spouse's earnings, $9,196. Id. at 886-87. See Comment, Professional
Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IOWA L. REV. 705, 706 n.18
(1979).
83. 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
84. Id. at -, 185 N.E.2d at 775.
85. See also Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973) (wife who supported
husband through medical school awarded $7,200 alimony "for the like period of years that
she contributed to family upkeep"); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978)
(husband ordered to pay $15,000 gross alimony to wife for her aid in putting husband
through medical school).
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Inman v Inman
The next case to consider whether a spouse's degree constitutes
marital property was Inman v. Inman,6 decided by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in early 1979. At the time of their divorce, the
Inmans had been married seventeen years. Throughout most of
their marriage, Mrs. Inman had worked as a teacher, enabling her
husband to attend dental school and to build a practice." Al-
though Dr. Inman worked steadily as a practicing dentist, the In-
mans were on the "brink of bankruptcy" as a result of Dr. inman's
poor financial management practices and a series of unwise invest-
ments.8 9 Encumbrances rendered worthless most of their prop-
erty 90 To achieve an equitable result in a division upon dissolu-
tion, the Kentucky court found a divisible marital property
interest in Dr. Inman's professional license to practice dentistry 91
Only a minimal amount of property was acquired through the in-
creased earning capacity represented by the dental degree. The
court reasoned that excluding the license from the marital estate
would allow the degreed spouse a "windfall of contribution to his
or her increased earning capacity ,,92 The court, however, quali-
fied9" the apportionability of a professional license as property-
"The best measure of a spouse's interest in such a degree should
be measured by his or her monetary investment in the degree, but
not equivalent to recovery in quasi-contract to prevent unjust
enrichment." 94
86. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
87. Id. at 267.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court learned during the time between the circuit court decision and the court
of appeals argument that Dr. Inman had defaulted on mortgage payments and that the
couple's home had been lost through foreclosure proceedings. Id.
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 269. The court stated:
This court has strong reservations about placing a professional license in the
category of marital property. In spite of these reservations, however, we
feel that there are certain instances in which treating a professional license as
marital property is the only way in which a court can achieve an equitable
result.
Id. at 268.
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Inman is the only state appellate court decision to hold that the
license to practice a profession is marital property subject to divi-
sion upon dissolution of marriage.9 5 Other decisions that grant the
working spouse a property division remedy generally consider fu-
ture earning potential to be the divisible asset.9 6
Hubbard v Hubbard
In Hubbard v. Hubbard9 7 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma af-
firmed in part and reversed in part the district court holding that
Mrs. Hubbard, who had supported her husband for twelve years
through college, medical school, internship and residency, had a
property interest in her husband's medical degree.9 " The Hubbards
divorced shortly after Dr. Hubbard completed his hospital resi-
dency The lower court found that Mrs. Hubbard had a " 'vested
interest in the defendant's medical profession, which is deemed to
be a valuable property right,' " and awarded her $100,000 gross
alimony in lieu of property division.9
In a per curiam opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took the
position of the majority in Graham that a professional degree is a
form of intangible, indivisible property in which no other person
can have a vested interest.100 The court held, rather, that Mrs.
Hubbard had an equitable claim to repayment in lieu of property
division for the investment she had made in Dr. Hubbard's educa-
tion and training.1°  Thus, instead of a right to a proportional
95. Id. at 269. The court fixed the measure of damages as "the amount spent for direct
support and school expenses during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and
adjustments for inflation, apportioned to the spouse who provided support when
there is little or no increased earning capacity provided by the supported spouse's de-
gree or training." Id. at 269-70.
96. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 77 (Iowa 1978); Diment v. Di-
ment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
97. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
98. Id. at 749.
99. Id. at 749-50 (quoting trial court opinion of Judge Harris).
100. Id. at 750.
101. Id. The court stated:
He would leave the marriage with an earning capacity increased by $250,000.00
which was obtained in substantial measure through the efforts and sacrifices of
his wife. She, on the other hand, would leave the marriage without either a
return on her investment or an earning capacity similarly increased through
joint efforts.
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share of the defendant's anticipated net income over the next
twelve years, 102 Mrs. Hubbard had a right to maintain a claim
against her husband for reimbursement.'03
Relying on the reasoning of the Graham dissent' and the opin-
ion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Inman,10 5 the Hubbard
majority contended that granting Mrs. Hubbard a right to com-
pensation was necessary to prevent her husband's unjust enrich-
ment.'0 6 Limiting Mrs. Hubbard's claim to alimony for support
and maintenance, according to the court, would require her unrea-
sonably to forego remarriage in order to realize a return on her
investment.' o
Three members of the court would have sustained the trial
court's decision on the remedy available'08 and would have sus-
tained the award of $100,000 to Mrs. Hubbard. 10 9 Justice Laven-
der, writing for the dissent, would have found the increased future
earning potential an asset for distribution as alimony in lieu of
property division rather than as a claim for reimbursement. °10
Id. at 750-51. The court stated further:
It is precisely because of this total joint commitment to Dr. Hubbard's educa-
tion and training that there were few conventional assets such as an expensive
home, furnishings, savings or investments, to divide at the time of divorce. All
the resources of the marriage had been dissipated on Dr. Hubbard's education.
Id. at 751.
102. Id. at 750 (citing trial court opinion). The trial court accepted expert testimony on
the fact and established that Dr. Hubbard's minimum net income over the next twelve
years-the length of time plaintiff had supported husband through school and training-
was $250,000. The trial court also determined that Mrs. Hubbard was entitled to 40% of
that amount, or $100,000. Id.
103. Id. at 750-52.
104. 194 Colo. 429, -, 574 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
105. 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
106. 603 P.2d at 751.
107. Id. at 751-52. See also Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 107 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). The
court in Hubbard partially overruled an earlier decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (1977), insofar as one could interpret Colvert to "mean that
a court can consider the future earnings of a spouse in setting the amount of alimony, [and]
then designate the alimony payments based on future income as property division alimony."
Id. at 752. Thus, in a limited holding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to
maintain an action for a return on her investment.
108. 603 P.2d at 753 (Lavender, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 753-54 (Lavender, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 753 (Lavender, C.J., dissenting).
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DeWitt v DeWitt
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently considered whether an
advanced educational degree constitutes marital property In De-
Witt v. DeWitt,"' the court held that neither a professional de-
gree, nor a license, nor education constitutes marital property.112
The DeWitts married in 1968 and separated permanently in
1977 113 Mr. DeWitt, a full-time student, was employed part-time
from 1968 until he completed a law degree in 1975.114 Mrs. DeWitt
worked full-time as a legal secretary during most of the mar-
riage. 1 5 In addition she performed most of the household and
child care tasks, handled the family finances, and worked part-
time assisting her husband m several business ventures." 6 Mr. De-
Witt was employed by his father's law firm upon completion of his
law school education."1 Subsequently, Mrs. DeWitt quit her job to
attend school full-time and completed an associate degree in ac-
counting prior to the institution of divorce proceedings." 8
The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by making a property division award that divided the plaintiff
husband's law degree between the parties upon divorce. 19 The
Wisconsin court chose instead to follow the opinion of the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals in Graham, 2 0 and specifically rejected the
reasoning of Horstmann"s' and Inman,121 saying:
[E]quity compels some form of remuneration for a spouse whose
111. 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
112. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 770.
113. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63.
114. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63. Plaintiff-husband also spent substantial time,
money, and effort on home improvements to three structures owned by the parties during
marriage. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63.
115. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63.
116. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63.
117. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 762-63.
118. Id. at , 296 N.W.2d at 763. Mrs. DeWitt alleged that at the time of marriage the
parties had "agreed that it would be financially preferable for the plaintiff to attend school
and complete his law degree first, and that she would then complete her college education."
Plaintiff denied these allegations. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 763.
119. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 765. See Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis. 2d 854, 275 N.W.2d 902
(1979); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978).
120. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). See notes 50-69 & accompanying text supra.
121. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). See notes 71-82 & accompanying text supra.
122. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). See notes 86-96 & accompanying text supra.
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contributions to the marriage have significantly exceeded those
of the mate. We cannot agree, however, that equity is served by
attempting to place a dollar value on something so intangible as
a professional education, degree, or license. The difficulties in-
herent in that attempt are illustrated by this case.
The "cost approach" fails to consider the scholastic ef-
forts and acumen of the degree holder, which may well have a
bearing on the income-yielding potential of the education. It
treats the parties as though they were strictly business partners,
one of whom has made a calculated investment in the commod-
ity of the other's professional training, expecting a dollar for
dollar return. We do not think that most marital planning is so
coldly undertaken. 123
The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for re-
consideration of its denial of alimony, 24 and indicated that the
parties' disparate financial contributions to the marriage and dis-
parate attainments during the marriage were proper factors for the
lower court's consideration in awarding maintenance and making
property division.125
Justice Dykman filed a concurring opinion in which he disagreed
with the majority's refusal to consider the degree a marital asset
under Wisconsin law.' 26 Although concurring in the result,
Dykman felt that the court's opinion in DeWitt unwarrantedly,
unnecessarily, and unreasonably limited the trial court's options in
providing an equitable settlement between the parties upon di-
vorce. 127 Citing Leighton v. Leighton,128 Justice Dykman stated
that the majority opinion was inconsistent with Wisconsin prece-
dent that allowed valuation and division of future contingent inter-
123. 98 Wis. 2d at - , 296 N.W.2d at 767.
124. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 767. The court stated:
[W]e agree with the plaintiff's contention that a division based upon such
a valuation necessarily involves a "division" of post-divorce earnings. [The
statute does not authorize the] court which has determined that alimony is not
warranted to surcharge one party by awarding the other party property in ex-
cess of the net value of the marital estate, thereby creating what amounts to a
"lien" on future earnings.
Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
125. Id. at -' 296 N.W.2d at 770.
126. Id. at -' 296 N.W.2d at 770-71 (Dykman, J., concurring).
127. Id. at -' 296 N.W.2d at 770-71 (Dykman, J., concurring).
128. 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978).
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ests in property for purposes of property settlement.129
Even more compelling, in Dykman's view, was the potential for
injustice created by the DeWitt opinion in the situation in which
the married parties had acquired no substantial assets during mar-
riage and the working spouse was not qualified to receive an award
of alimony 130 Although the majority indicated that a showing of
need is not required for a spouse to qualify for a maintenance
award, Wisconsin case law indicated the contrary '3' Thus, in Jus-
tice Dykman's view, the inability to consider one spouse's profes-
sional degree as an asset results in the unjust situation in which
the income of one spouse benefits the other spouse while the con-
tributing spouse has no available method of compensation for her
contribution.13 2
Summary
The preceding cases demonstrate a willingness on the part of the
courts to look to the particular facts of each case in reaching a
solution that treats both litigants fairly Courts that deny the
claim of the spouse who petitions for a division of a professional
degree as a marital asset usually either find other substantial as-
sets to divide between the parties or award alimony to the peti-
tioning spouse. 33 On the other hand, cases that present the court
with a situation in which the working martial partner is capable of
self-support and the parties have accumulated no substantial, con-
ventional assets during marriage generally find some sort of valua-
ble asset in the nonworking spouse's professional degree capable of
division between the parties.3 The sole exception to this factual
129. 98 Wis. 2d at -, 296 N.W.2d at 770-71 (Dykman, J., concurring).
130. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 770 (Dykman, J., concurring); see Leighton v. Leighton,
81 Wis. 2d 630, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978) (unvested interest in pension fund could be included
in a property division; the existence of contingencies is not a basis for excluding an asset
from property division). See also Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235
(1978); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975).
131. 98 Wis. 2d at -, 296 N.W.2d at 770 & n.2.
132. Id. at -, 296 N.W.2d at 770-71. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis. 2d 631,
642-43, 242 N.W.2d 165, 171 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Stern v.
Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761
(Ct. App. 1980).
134. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. In-
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pattern is the Colorado Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage
of Graham.' 5 The court in Graham left the working spouse with-
out a remedy Mr. Graham took his degree and left the marriage
with a greatly enhanced earning capacity 136 Mrs. Graham left the
marriage with nothing.
The compelling injustice of Graham illustrates the need for the
specific adoption of a property distribution remedy for the situa-
tion in which a marriage breaks apart shortly after one spouse has
completed an education with the aid of the other spouse. The
premises of acknowledging the working spouse's interest in the ed-
ucated partner's professional degree are that the court should rec-
ognize and compensate the working spouse for contributions to-
ward the student spouse's attainment of a professional degree and
that the educated spouse who receives the support of his working
mate should not benefit from unjust enrichment. The supporting
spouse expended time, money, and effort in expectation of an in-
creased future income and an enhanced social position.
A limited rule recognizing the contributions of the working
spouse to the attainment of the degree also considers the sacrifices
made by one spouse to support the other during professional
school. Although these sacrifices differ with the circumstances of
each case, some of the more common sacrifices include: foregoing
the standard of living made possible by two incomes; the addi-
tional strains placed on the family budget by educational costs;
and foregoing advanced education for the working spouse because
of economic and personal factors.13 7
man, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
135. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
136. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 78-79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
137. E.g., DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980). See Erickson,
Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Education Goals: How the Law Can Ensure
Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 961.
A growing number of jurisdictions are comparing the contribution of one spouse as home-
maker and parent and the educational and career achievements of the other spouse when
determining property division and/or maintenance: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Dela-
ware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See Freed & Foster, supra note 11. While such a consideration is a step in
the right direction, it is irrelevant if no marital property exists to divide between the divorc-
ing partners. In the future, courts may extrapolate from the recognition of contributions of
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Upon dissolution the working spouse has realized none of her
expectations. Courts should strive to provide at least a partial rem-
edy to the nonstudent spouse for sacrifices made. A court ought to
divide as property the quantifiable benefits of the graduate educa-
tion of one spouse between the parties to reflect their respective
efforts toward its attainment.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
What is Property?
Several courts that deny the working spouse relief hold that a
professional degree or license, or the future earning capacity it gen-
erates, is not property.13 8 These courts deny the plaintiff's claim to
an entitlement because the degree, or the increased earning power
it represents, lacks many of the attributes traditionally associated
with the concept of property, particularly alienability and
tangibility.
Thus whether a court will consider an advanced educational de-
gree as property depends upon the court's understanding of the
term "property."1 In his text on property, Dean Cribbet states
that "[a]s a layman you are accustomed to speak of the thing itself
as property; as a lawyer you must realize that property is a con-
cept, separate and apart from the thing. Property consists, in fact,
of the legal relations among people in regard to a thing."4 0 Later
both spouses to the marriage to award relief when a spouse puts the other through profes-
sional school. The better rule, however, allows the court to grant the supporting spouse an
interest in the educated spouse's degree or future earning capacity.
138. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Hiscox v. Hiscox, 385
N.E.2d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
139. The court in Graham stated the issue in the following manner:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed, even
by the broad views of the concept of property. It does not have an exchange
value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to
the holder. It terminates on the death of the holder and is not inheritable. It
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property. In our view it has none of the attributes
of property in the usual sense of that term.
Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 77.
140. J. CRImBBT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 1975).
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in the same text, Cribbet refers to the situation in which a court
refuses to grant relief when it finds no property interest because
the court may act only to protect property rights, and declares:
"[I]s not this reasoning in reverse? If the court grants the protec-
tion, it has created a species of property If it refuses the
remedy then no property can be said to exist because 'take away
laws and property ceases.' "141
Thus, property is that bundle of rights that the courts recognize
as property.142 In order to make the determination that a thing is
property, the court should ask whether, as a matter of policy, the
definition of property should include a particular concept. For a
court to state a general definition of property and then to ask
whether a professional degree or license conforms to the defini-
tional requirements is insufficient. Such a deductive approach ig-
nores the special characteristics of both a divorce proceeding and a
professional education.
The purpose of most modern dissolution statutes lies in mitigat-
ing the potential harm to spouses and their children caused by di-
141. Id. at 5. At an earlier date, Jeremy Bentham expressed a similar view of the concept
of property:
The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persuasion
of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing possessed
Now this expectation, tlns persuasion, can only be the work of law. I
cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except
through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me It is only
through the protection of the law that I am able to inclose a field, and give
myself up to its cultivation with the sure though distant hope of harvest
Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made
there was no property; Take away laws and property ceases.
J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-69 (1975).
142. See generally Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). In Roth the United States Supreme Court described a property interest in this way.
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined.
408 U.S. at 577.
The working spouse who supports the student spouse during school clearly relies on the
supposition, as does the student spouse, that the investment will reap a return. See also
Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097 (1973).
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vorce.143 If divorce courts sincerely attempted to vindicate the le-
gitimate expectations of both parties with regard to interests in a
professional license, they could serve well the goal of mitigation of
harm.1
44
One spouse, for example, may have interrupted, discontinued, or
sacrificed an education altogether to provide a livelihood for the
couple while the other spouse attends school. The spouse who sup-
ports his or her mate through a graduate program sacrifices a
higher standard of living and delays or foregoes otherwise desirable
expenditures and investments with the legitimate expectation of
reaping a future reward, an increased social and economic position
and a future standard of living that accompanies professional
status.
14 5
The achievement of an advanced degree greatly enhances the
student's earning ability, and hence the student's personal posi-
tion. Upon dissolution the student spouse will leave the marriage
with a valuable degree. The working partner who has supported
143. For example, modern statutes generally have eliminated fault both as a sole ground
for divorce and as a consideration m awarding alimony. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT.
144. Courts and commentators alike recognize that the situation in which a marriage
breaks up shortly after the student spouse receives a degree is not unusual. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, -, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting)
("The case presents the not unfamiliar pattern of the wife, willing to sacrifice for a more
secure family financial future, works [sic] to educate her husband only to be awarded a
divorce decree shortly after he is awarded the degree."). Erickson, Spousal Support Toward
the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 947, 948 n.4. " 'Putting hubby through' college, law school, medical school or other
educational program (getting a Ph.T. as it is sometimes called), appears to be a firmly en-
trenched American tradition, despite the women's liberation movement."
145. Numerous studies have demonstrated that income levels relate directly to educa-
tional levels. One commentator states: "So close is the association between educational at-
tainment and income that, whether annual mean income figures or lifetime earnings are
considered, one fact emerges: percentage increases in income vary directly with educational
attainment." Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10
CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 605 (1974). Moreover, increases in annual income correlate with as little
as a one year increase in schooling. See BUREAu OF TIM CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
ANNUAL MEAN INcoME, LiFrMEm INcoME, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MEN IN THE
UNITED STATES, FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1956 To 1966 (1968); Brunner & Wayland, Education
and Income, 32 J. EDUC. & Soc. 21 (1958); Glick & Miller, Educational Level and Potential
Income, 21 AM. Soc. REv. 307 (1956); Howthakker, Education and Income, 41 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 24 (1959); Miller, Annual and Lifetime Income In Relation to Education: 1933-
59, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 962 (1960); Miller, Capital Value of Man In Law, 6 CAL. TRIAL LAW.
J. 33 (1969); Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POLITICAL ECON. 571 (1960).
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the student spouse with expectations of benefitting from the en-
hanced earning power of the degreed spouse instead receives noth-
ing. The working spouse's expenditures are an immediate invest-
ment in the nonworking spouse's degree and a future investment in
a better way of life for both. To deprive the working spouse of any
yield on the investment does that spouse a grave injustice.
The same courts that refuse to grant the supporting spouse a
property interest in the other's professional degree generally con-
sider the degree and the increased earning capacity it represents as
factors the court must consider in the division of property and the
award of maintenance. 146 If, however, the working spouse is self-
supporting and the couple has acquired no substantial assets dur-
ing their marriage, consideration of the increased future earning
capacity of one spouse becomes irrelevant because the court often
has no basis upon which to award support. 4 7 Additionally, under
the court's definition of property, no property exists to divide be-
tween the marital partners upon dissolution.
Even if an Advanced Professional Degree Is Property, Is it Divisi-
ble Property?
Courts that are willing to recognize in theory the existence of a
property interest in an advanced educational degree nevertheless
often hold that, because the degree has only intangible or intellec-
tual value, its monetary worth upon division is negligible.' 48 Under
this view of a degree as property with only speculative value, the
working spouse reaps nothing by way of property division.149
146. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); In re Mar-
riage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, -, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340,
- 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975). See also Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d
773 (1961).
147. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, -, 574 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1978) (Carri-
gan, J., dissenting). Judge Carrigan m his frequently cited dissenting opinion in Graham
points out that under the Colorado maintenance statute, COLo. RE v. STAT. § 14-10-114(2)
(1973), Mrs. Graham was ineligible to receive an award of maintenance because she was
clearly self-supporting. Thus, Judge Carrigan correctly finds that the majority opinion in
Graham leaves Mrs. Graham without a remedy. 194 Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 79 (Carrigan,
J., dissenting).
148. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969); Frank-
lin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, , 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945). See also In re Marriage
of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
149. See note 148 supra.
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Placing a value on an individual's earning potential undoubtedly
engages the court in speculation. Emphasis on the speculative na-
ture of the value of a degree ignores the fact that the educated
spouse does not have a vested right to any level of income or prop-
erty, but has only a potential for higher income made possible by
the achievement of the advanced degree. The crucial factor, there-
fore, is not the eventual earnings of the degreed spouse but rather
the effect of the present right to practice a profession on the
spouse's earning capacity. 50
Other instances in which courts generally find a divisible prop-
erty interest m an equally intangible concept with an equally spec-
ulative value can guide courts troubled by the speculative value of
a professional degree. 51 Commentators often cite three analogies
regarding valuation and divisibility: professional goodwill,152 pen-
sion and retirement benefits,1 5  and personal injury or wrongful
death awards for lost future earning capacity.1 "
Goodwill
The accounting concept of goodwill,155 like an advanced profes-
sional degree, is by nature an asset with an elusive value. Unlike an
advanced educational degree, however, professional goodwill is an
asset capable of valuation and division between parties upon di-
150. See note 145 supra.
151. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561
(1976) (nonvested pension rights are a distributable property asset); Nixon v. Nixon, 525
S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (proceeds from personal injury claim held distributable
upon divorce); Stem v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (professional goodwill is
property subject to division upon marital dissolution); McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super.
515, 377 A.2d 697 (App. Div. 1977) (pension benefits held distributable between parties
upon divorce).
152. See notes 155-160 & accompanying text infra.
153. See notes 162-171 & accompanying text mifra.
154. See notes 172-182 & accompanying text infra.
155. Justice Story defined goodwill as
[t]he advantage or benefit, which is acqired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives
from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or com-
mon celebrity, or reputation for skill or affuence, or punctuality, or from other
accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or
prejudices.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PARTNERsHIPs § 99 (1968).
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vorce in both common law156 and community property jurisdic-
tions.157 Courts hold that the nonprofessional spouse, having con-
tributed to the building of the professional practice through the
provision of services, financial, domestic, or otherwise, has a valua-
ble interest in.the goodwill of the professional spouse's practice.158
Furthermore, although recognizing that goodwill is an amorphous
asset, some courts maintain that the problems encountered in val-
uing goodwill are an improper basis for a court's refusal to ac-
knowledge and to consider the existence of the goodwill value
when dividing the value of a professional practice between spouses
in a marital dissolution proceeding.159
Methods of placing a value on professional goodwill vary accord-
ing to the circumstances of each case. Factors considered by the
courts when valuing the goodwill of a professional practice include
the length of time that the professional spouse has practiced, the
comparative success of the spouse's professional practice, the pro-
fessional spouse's age and health, the past profits of the practice,
the fixed resources of the practice, and the physical assets of the
practice.1 60
Pension and Retirement Benefits
The general willingness of courts to divide pension and retire-
156. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nichols, No. 78-716 (Colo. Ct. App. March 3, 1980); Stern
v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In re
Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976). But see Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). See generally Lurvey, Professinal Goodwill on Marital Dissolu-
tion: Is it Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. S.B.J. 27 (1977).
158. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, -, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974);
In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, -, 588 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1979) (citing Golden
v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 735 (1969)). One court also has
stated flatly that goodwill is an asset; if acquired during the marriage, it is a community
asset; hence, the asset of goodwill is divisible upon divorce. In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.
App. 729, -, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976).
159. E.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974);
In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976). The court in
Lopez states: "The fact that 'professional goodwill' may be elusive, intangible, difficult to
evaluate and will ordinarily require special disposition, is not reason to ignore its existence
m a proper case." 38 Cal. App. 3d at -, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
160. See In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 484, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976). The
only breakdown m the analogy between a professional education and professional goodwill is
the inability to transfer a professional education.
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ment benefits of the employed spouse upon divorce provides a sec-
ond analogy to support the proposition that courts ought to con-
sider a professional degree as property for purposes of division
upon divorce.""1 Even though pension and retirement benefits nor-
mally are not mature, but are future interests, contingent future
interests, or even expectancies, the benefits may have a value to
both spouses that is capable of division as property. A majority of
courts that have considered the question of divisibility of pension
benefits hold that the benefits are divisible property.1 6 2
In community property jurisdictions, pension and retirement
benefits constitute divisible community assets whether the inter-
ests are mature, 63 vested,'" or unvested but accrued.6 5 Equitable
distribution jurisdictions, though less willing to regard benefits as
property than are community property jurisdictions, nevertheless
frequently hold pension and retirement benefits divisible. 6'
161. Pension and retirement benefits fall into three general categories: mature, vested,
and accrued. A mature benefit is a benefit that a beneficiary is presently and immediately
entitled to receive. A vested benefit is a benefit certain to be paid, but the employee does
not receive the payment until he retires or otherwise terminates his employment relation-
ship with the payor. An accrued or earned benefit is a benefit that accrues as a result of
employment, but the employee presently has no guarantee of eventual payment. Bonavich,
Allocation of Private Pension Benefits in Illinois Divorce Proceedings, 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
1, 12-13 (1979). See Bass, Division at Divorce of ERISA Pensions, 4 FAM. L. REP. See gener-
ally J. MAMORSKY, PENSION AND PROFIrr SHARING PLANS: A BAsic GUIDE, 1-37 (1977).
162. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 570 P.2d 758 (1977); In re Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976); In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo.
App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); Shill v. Shill, 5 FAm. L. REi. 1185 (Idaho 1979); Moon v.
Moon, 345 So. 2d 168 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977); Chisnell v.
Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940 (1978); Kruger v.
Kruger, 73 N.J. 463, 375 A.2d 659 (1977); Whittenburg v. Whittenburg, 523 S.W.2d 797
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975). But see In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347
(1975); Savage v. Savage, - Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978).
163. See, e.g., Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624 (1975); Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975). But see Digre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So. 2d
900 (1955).
164. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 952, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); Coilida v. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
165. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); In re Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364,
534 P.2d 1355 (1975). See also Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension
Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187 (1977-78).
166. See note 162 supra. Courts also have found divisible property interests in similar
kinds of assets. E.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (1978) (divisible prop-
erty interest in husband's disability benefits); Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977)
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Generally, the spouse may claim a divisible interest in mature
benefits received by his or her marriage partner.0 7 The majority of
equitable division jurisdictions, though taking a varied view of how
the right to a spouse's mature benefits originates, hold that vested
but presently unpayable benefits constitute marital property sub-
ject to division. 0 8 Some courts, however, treat the existence of un-
matured benefits or assets only as a factor in determining an award
of alimony or the distribution of other property, not as divisible
property per se.169
Courts frequently hold that pension and retirement benefits that
have yet to vest m the recipient are neither a divisible property
interest nor a factor in an equitable distribution between
spouses.7 0 Even in equitable distribution states, however, a grow-
ing minority of jurisdictions allow a court to consider nonvested
property rights on dissolution. The contingency of the property in-
terest affects the value of the right, not the existence of the right
itself.17 1
(divisible property benefits in military disability payments); Elliott v. Elliott, - Minn.
-, 274 N.W.2d 75 (1978) (social security benefits are divisible property); Anspach v. An-
spach, 557 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (social security benefits are divisible property); In
re Marriage of Columbus, 31 Or. App. 811, 571 P.2d 565 (1977) (savings plan with employer
held to be divisible asset).
167. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 579 P.2d 613 (1978); Tavares v.
Tavares, 58 Haw. 541, 574 P.2d 125 (1978); Pellegrmo v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342
A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1975); Schafer v. Schafer, 9 Wis. 2d 502, 101 N.W.2d 780 (1960).
168. See, e.g., Stigall v. Stigall, 151 Ind. App. 26, 277 N.E.2d 802 (1972); In re Marriage of
Ralston, 242 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1976); McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 377 A.2d
697 (App. Div. 1977). But see Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976);
Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975).
169. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 338 So. 2d 416 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976); In re Marriage of
Ralston, 252 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1976); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d
272 (1976); Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958); Leighton v. Leigh-
ton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978).
170. Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alas. 1979); Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537
S.W.2d 367 (1976); Yelkm v. Yelkm, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975); Savage v. Savage,
Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 269 N.W.2d
264 (1978); Ray v. Ray, 336 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
171. In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 IlM. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979); Elliott v. Elliott,
- Minn. -, 274 N.W.2d 75 (1978); Chisnell v. Clusnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d
155 (1978).
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Tort Awards
In a wrongful death172 or a personal injury action, 173 courts con-
sistently have recognized the need to determine the value of a pro-
fessional education in order to compensate fully a plaintiff for loss
of future income. A court easily can extend the tort concept of val-
uation of future earning capacity to a situation in which the sup-
porting spouse will lose the economic benefits of the degreed
spouse's education upon dissolution of the marriage. The nonstu-
dent spouse will lose the same expectancy as the plaintiff will in
the personal injury or wrongful death action.7 4
Damages in a personal injury or wrongful death action are unliq-
uidated; no one fixed mathematical formula is used to decide each
case. Rather, each case involves different facts, considerations, and
probabilities to which courts cannot attempt to apply a formula.
Instead, courts must assume that each situation is unique and rec-
ognize that a determination of damages involves speculation, un-
certainty, and arbitrariness. Courts, however, rarely deny a remedy
for lost future earning capacity in a personal injury or wrongful
death action merely because assessing future earning capacity in-
172. See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Nelson, 369 F Supp. 1206 (D.S.D. 1974), aff'd, 503 F.2d 94
(8th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff wife of decedent college student who planned to become a high
school teacher and coach allowed to recover under South Dakota law $150,000 discounted to
present value based on her decedent husband's possible future earnings as a teacher and
coach); Morrison v. State, 516 P.2d 402 (Alas. 1973) (parents of decedent, a 13 year old girl,
allowed to recover for lost future earning capacity); Borak v. Bridge, 524 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (parents of decedent college student who planned to become a banker al-
lowed to recover for loss of their son's future earning capacity and his "benefits" to them).
See generally Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Personal
Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REv. 351 (1969).
173. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug Inc., 374 F Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (plaintiff
allowed to recover for lost earning capacity as an architect as a result of blindness caused by
use of defendant's product; the proper measure for determining future earning capacity is
neither age, preinjury occupation, nor the nature of the proposed profession but rather skill,
likelihood of becoming a member of the profession, and availability of work in that area;
instructions to the jury protected against wholly speculative testimony); Frankel v. United
States, 321 F Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (plaintiff, an art student, injured in an accident
with a government employee, resulting in complete disability;, her progress in school, family
background, and painting had indicated excellent progress and the court awarded $62,000
for loss of future earning capacity even though the plaintiff was still in school and had not
yet begun a career) (applying Pennsylvama law).
174. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL.
W.L. Rav. 590 (1974); 11 CONN. L. Rav. 62 (1978).
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volves the court in speculation. 1 7  Courts should be equally hesi-
tant to deny relief to a nonstudent spouse who has lost the eco-
nomic potential of the partial value of the education that she
helped to provide.78
Several courts, moreover, have found that a cause of action, set-
tlement, or personal injury award is marital property for purposes
of property division upon marital dissolution. In Nixon v. Nixon,
for example, the injured spouse claimed that a personal injury set-
tlement was separate personal property not subject to division
upon divorce. 78 The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed, holding
that the Missouri property division statute provides for the divi-
sion of all marital property and that marital property includes the
property acquired as a result of the settlement of a personal injury
action.1 7 9 California, in particular, has been willing to include per-
sonal injury actions in community property8 " upon dissolution of
marriage even though the court has recognized that such an action
is both nonsurvivable 181 and nontransferable.118
Valuatin
Of the appellate court decisions that have awarded the working
spouse an interest in the degreed spouse's future earning capacity
or professional degree, most have made the award on a restitution
175. See, e.g., Har-pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1967);
Kroger Co. v. Rawlings, 251 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1958).
176. For example, courts have considered earning capacity even when the injured party
had no previous consistent earning history. E.g., Morrison v. State, 516 P.2d 402 (Alas.
1973); Hildyard v. Western Fastners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, -, 522 P.2d 596, 601 (1974)
(recovery allowed for loss of earning capacity even though plaintiff was unemployed); Flor-
ida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1952) (recovery allowed for lost
earning capacity of unemployed housewife because she might have to work at some future
time).
177. 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
178. Id. at 839; accord, Hall v. Hall, 349 So. 2d 1349 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
179. 525 S.W.2d at 839.
180. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952); see Comment, 56 DEN. L.J. 677,
688 (1979).
181. De La Torre v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 754, 254 P 1105 (1927). The California state legis-
lature recently has made a cause of action for personal injury survivable. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 573 (West Supp. 1980).
182. Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 206 Cal. 461, 274 P 959 (1929).
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or implied-loan-value theory""3 The assumption that a profes-
sional education is solely a monetary purchase underlies the resti-
tution or implied-loan-value theory; the court measures the work-
Ing spouse's recovery by the amount of that spouse's financial
contribution to the other spouse's attainment of the professional
degree.1 8 4 Thus, the student spouse must "repay" the implied loan.
Some courts award the working spouse interest on the implied
loan, whereas others restrict recovery to the amount of the working
spouse's financial contribution.
In one sense, the restitution measure undercompensates the
working spouse because a professional education has more value
than is reflected in its monetary cost. The degree has a value in the
future as an asset that becomes more valuable with time, experi-
ence, and expenditure. Moreover, acquiring an education repre-
sents more than a mere monetary purchase. Both partners expend
time and effort in its acquisition. The working spouse's right to
share in the benefits necessarily ought to hinge on more than the
financial contribution made toward the attainment of the degree;
rather, the working spouse's overall contribution to the marital
partnership and the degree earned ought to provide the basis of
the right to share. The monetary cost of the spouse's professional
education relates only tangentially to the real value of the educa-
tion as the means to an end of practicing a profession. Therefore,
to the extent that the value of an education exceeds its cost, the
educated spouse at least partially becomes unjustly enriched.
The restitution measure, however, does have certain advan-
tages. 85 No speculation regarding the future earning capacity of
the degreed spouse is necessary because the court can calculate
easily the amount due the working spouse by reference to known
variables.1 86 Moreover, the restitution measure is consistent with
183. See In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). See also
Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693,
264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio App. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
184. See, e.g., 11 CONN. L. Rav. 62, 73-74 (1978); Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann:
Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677, 688-89 (1979).
185. See note 184 supra.
186. Known variables include, but are not limited to, cost of tuition, fees, and books,
financial contribution of each spouse to the family, living expense, and scholarships and
fellowships received by the student spouse. Comment, The Interest of the Community in a
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the practice of shaping a decree by equating the commitment and
investment of the parties in the marriage with the duration of mar-
riage.18 7 The reimbursement measure, although inadequate, better
serves equity than does no remedy at all.
Several lower court decisions have awarded the working spouse a
measure of recovery different from a reimbursement measure for
contributions made by one spouse to the other spouse's future
earning capacity.188 Generally, these courts determine through ex-
pert actuarial testimony the difference between what the degreed
spouse would have earned had the spouse not achieved the degree
and the spouse's projected future earning capacity with the degree.
The court then determines the percentage of time, money, and ef-
fort that each spouse expended toward obtaining the degree, divid-
mg the difference accordingly. 8 9 A sizable award to the working
spouse and a reversal by an appellate court usually result.190
Appellate courts consider excessive an award based on the differ-
ence between predegree and postdegree earning capacity. A large
property division award to a spouse married for only a few years
appears punitive. In avoiding inequity to the degreed spouse, how-
ever, the courts heap inequity on the other and set potentially
harsh precedent that denies the working spouse any remedy.
One commentator 91 suggests a compromise formula that repre-
sents an accurate assessment of the property division value of the
present right to practice a profession without "punishing" the
degreed spouse.192 The formula allocates to the working spouse as
reimbursement approximately one-half of the "opportunity cost"
of the degree. Opportunity cost, as defined by the author, is the
Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. Ray. 590, 604 (1974).
187. See, e.g., Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968).
188. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); notes 57, 102
supra.
189. Cf. In re Marriage of Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, -, 555 P.2d 527, 528 (1976)
(descriptions of findings of trial court), aff'd, 194 Colo. 429, -, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (1978);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Okla. 1979) (description of findings of trial
court).
190. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Mar-
nage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975).
191. Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL.
W.L. Rav. 590 (1974).
192. Id. at 603.
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direct cost of the education plus the indirect cost of the educa-
tion.'1 3 Under the cost opportunity formula, the court has the
power to adjust the percentage of the opportunity cost to be
awarded according to the relative contributions by each party to
the attainment of the degree.1 If the direct cost of the education
derives from sources outside the marriage, the working spouse re-
ceives her equitable share of the opportunity cost alone.
THE INADEQUATE ALTERNATIVES
Alimony
Under the common law, alimony derived from the husband's
duty of support to his wife.195 Generally, alimony was a permanent
award set at an amount sufficient to provide the wife with her ba-
sic life needs: food, clothing, shelter, and miscellaneous necessi-
ties.9 ' With the increasing frequency of divorce, the advent of no-
fault dissolution, and the growing trend toward sexual equality, the
focus of alimony, now usually called by a sex neutral term such as
support or maintenance, has changed. Need or inability to provide
193. Id. at 604. Direct cost refers to the direct purchase price of the degree based on
amounts paid for tuition, laboratory fees, and other incidental expenses. Indirect cost refers
to the expenditure of effort and skill by the student spouse. The two components together
yield the cost value of the student spouse's education.
194. Recognizing the shortcoming of the cost valuation method as reflecting only the ac-
quisition cost of the degree, the commentator suggests an alternative valuation formula that
could determine the amount of the working spouse's interest in the student spouse's degree.
The alternative formula assumes that the value of experience and skill increases with time
while the value of education diminishes with time. Calculations are made for each year of
the degree holder's remaining work life based on actuarial data. The commentator illus-
trates the formula mathematically- (income with professional education - income without
professional education) X (number of years of professional education + number of years
since professional education).
Although the formula may reflect accurately the interest of the working spouse in the
educated spouse's degree, such a formula is highly speculative. Hence a court reluctant to
divide the value of the degree between the parties on marital dissolution is unlikely to util-
ize the formula.
195. See H. CLARK, Tm LAW OF DoMmsTic RELATIONS § 14.1 (1968); Krauskopf &
Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of
Support, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 558, 563 (1974); Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and
Property Awards, 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 133, 135 (1974).
196. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DomsTic RELATIONS § 14.5 (1968); Note, Rehabilitative
Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution
Trauma, 12 U. S.F L. REv. 493 (1978).
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for oneself generally is the focal point of an award in alimony,19 7
the amount of which usually varies with the duration of the mar-
riage and the economic condition of the parties.198 In some juris-
dictions only the inability to support oneself is relevant to deter-
mining whether to award a petitioning spouse alimony '99 The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for example, makes financial
need the sole factor in awarding maintenance upon dissolution. 00
As a practical matter, therefore, maintenance may be unavailable
to the supporting spouse in some jurisdictions.
When one spouse supports the other during school and marital
dissolution follows shortly upon the nonworking spouse's attain-
ment of a professional degree or license, of necessity the working
spouse will have demonstrated the ability to support herself. In ad-
dition, the brevity of the marriage tends to reduce any possible
award to the petitioning spouse.20 1 That the married couple's stan-
dard of living is necessarily modest further influences the court's
award to the noneducated spouse because the measure of support
partially depends upon the marital standard of living.2 02 Thus the
speculative aspect of valuing future earning capacity, the brevity of
the marriage, the demonstrated ability of self-support, and the
modesty of the couple's standard of living combine to limit any
award to the working spouse.
The conceptual differences between alimony and property divi-
sion make alimony an unattractive alternative to property division
197. See, e.g., Grinold v. Grinold, 32 Conn. Supp. 225, 348 A.2d 32 (1975). See also Note,
Property, Maintenance and Child Support Decrees Under the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act, 18 S.D. L. Rav. 559, 567 (1973).
198. See generally, Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law
School Curriculum and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1972);
Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital
Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677 (1979).
199. See, e.g., Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, -, 144 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1966); Ma-
gruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, -, 209 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1973); Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc.
2d 4, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U.
COLO. L. REv. 403, 409 (1971).
200. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308.
201. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL.
W.L. REv. 590, 595 (1974).
202. See, e.g., Flanders v. Flanders, 240 Iowa 159, 40 N.W.2d 468 (1950); Prosser v. Pros-
ser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 468 (1953); McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d
1066 (1951). See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS § 14.5 (1968).
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for the working spouse. Each spouse's right to a portion of divisible
property is independent of need. An award of alimony, which is
not a right,203 is within the sole discretion of the court. In a prop-
erty division, on the other hand, a spouse has a right to receive
that portion of the combined marital property to which that
spouse has a legal or equitable claim.204 Although the amount of
the property to which each spouse has a valid claim varies, the
spouse admittedly has some interest in the property and therefore
may claim a return on the investment in recognition of any signifi-
cant contribution made to the parties' marital assets. Although the
court does not have to divide the property equally, the equitable
notion that each spouse is entitled to a just share of the property
accumulated as a result of that spouse's partnership effort influ-
ences the division of propertyY°5 In addition, a property division
203. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wash. 2d 639, _ 369 P.2d 516, 518 (1962); Note,
The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 133 (1974).
204. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 14.8 (1968); Daggett, Division of Prop-
erty upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAw & CoNmmp. PROB. 225 (1939).
205. See, e.g., Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Parsons v. Parsons, 68
Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975).
Professor Joan Krauskopf discusses from an economic point of view the problem of rec-
ompensing the supporting spouse upon marital dissolution. Krauskopf, Recompense for Fi-
nancing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital,
28 KA. L. REv. 379 (1980). Krauskopf treats the family unit as an economic "firm" in
which all members of the unit.seek together to maximize the total welfare of the firm. Id. at
386. Thus, the working spouse who contributes to the firm's economic well-being by sup-
porting both partners while the non-working spouse pursues an advanced education be-
comes a marital investor. The working spouse provides as an investment the source of funds
that provide the incentive for the non-working spouse to acquire the education. The author
labels the investment "marriage specific capital"; the gain realized as a result of one
spouse's attainment of a professional degree is valuable to both partners only if the marriage
remains intact. Id. at 387.
When a divorce occurs, the working spouse, in her capacity as a marital investor, seeks a
return on her investment. By adequately compensating the working spouse for her contribu-
tion to the non-working spouse's attainment of an advanced educational degree, the courts
shape the law to serve two important social goals: the economic productivity of society and
the welfare of the family unit. Id. at 395.
Rather than rehabilitative maintenance, periodic maintenance, or property division, Pro-
fessor Krauskopf prefers "in gross" maintenance as a solution to the problems engendered
by the attempt to reach a fair economic partition of the benefits of a professional education
when the parties to the marriage have no marital assets but the professional degree. Id. at
401. Maintenance or alimony in gross is a fixed, lump sum, non-modifiable award. Kraus-
kopf prefers the solution of maintenance in gross because "[t]he court may award this lump
sum regardless of whether other property is in existence without classifying the education or
the increased earning capacity as an asset. [Maintenance in gross] allows compensation tai-
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decree is advantageous to the degreed spouse over an award of ali-
mony because a property division decree constitutes a fixed and
finally settled award; the student spouse does not suffer the bur-
den of unending alimony payments and the risk of upward modifi-
cation of alimony payments. Rather, both parties, the payees and
payor, know exactly their rights and liabilities with respect to the
severed marriage relationship and may continue with life. More-
over, an award of alimony constitutes income to the working
spouse for income tax purposes, whereas a property distribution is
not income to the working spouse because it merely adjusts the
rights of the parties. °8
Nonmatnmonmal Equtable Remedies
When one spouse supports his or her mate through a graduate
school program, the supporting spouse rarely will extract from the
student spouse an express promise of repayment. Without a prom-
ise of repayment, a successful suit in equity for reimbursement is
lored to protect expectation interests rather than providing only 'damages' in the form of
periodic alimony for the lost opportunities of the relying spouse." Id. (footnote omitted).
Only a limited number of jurisdictions recognize maintenance in gross, however. Moss v.
Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); In re Cropp, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2957
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Sept. 6, 1979); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585
(1973). See also Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975). The state main-
tenance statute may not admit of an interpretation that permits maintenance in gross in the
circumstance of a professional degree, or the court may not wish to so interpret the mainte-
nance statute, even if theoretically permissible. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
429, , 574 P.2d 75, 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 270
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979). See also Krauskopf, supra, at 401. Moreover, maintenance as a con-
cept, whether periodic or in gross, implies a duty of one spouse, traditionally the husband,
to support the other. See, e.g., Gibson v. Stiles, 240 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951);
Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940); Boudwin v. Boudwm, 162 Wash.
142, -, 298 P.2d 337, 338 (1931). Thus, maintenance as a concept stresses one spouse's
need for support and the other spouse's obligation to support. If maintenance concerns sup-
port, the investment analogy becomes extraneous to the consideration of an award of main-
tenance. On the other hand, the property division remedy readily adapts to the investment
analogy. If the professional degree constitutes property, the court can value it with the aid
of expert witnesses; then the court can divide the degree's value by considering the relative
contributions of the parties to the attainment of the degree.
Therefore, the law ought to adopt the property division remedy, because the court must
focus on the asset acquired and the relative contributions to its acquisition, rather than on
the relative financial condition of each spouse and the duty of support.
206. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1). See, e.g., Note, Selected Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property Set-
tlements, 41 IND. L. REv. 732 (1966).
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unlikely. 0 7 In addition, a constructive trust theory is unavailable
in most jurisdictions because the plaintiff must prove both that the
defendant was unjustly enriched and that the defendant had
fraudulent intent.10 Moreover, the constructive trust theory suf-
fers the defect that no specific res exists to which the trust can
attach.209
Within the matrimonial setting a quantum meruit remedy also is
unlikely to succeed. A recovery for services rendered by a support-
ing spouse potentially would reduce the unjust enrichment of the
student spouse. In many jurisdictions, however, the presumption
that marital services are gratuitous, and thus performed without
the expectation of payment, precludes the working spouse from
making an equitable claim for time, money, and effort expended to
aid the student spouse in the attainment of a professional
degree.21e
Even if a quantum meruit remedy is available to the working
spouse, it fails to compensate adequately the nonstudent spouse
for contributions made toward the attainment of a professional de-
207. Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the
Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. Rxv. 947, 948-49.
208. E.g., Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A.2d 835 (1956); Kachanian v. Kachanian, 100
N.H. 135, 121 A.2d 566 (1956); Marston v. Myers, 217 Or. 498, 342 P.2d 1111 (1959); Rosen
v. Rosen, 384 Pa. 547, 121 A.2d 89 (1956).
209. See notes 139-149 & accompanying text supra. One prominent text describes the
constructive trust as follows.
A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is sub-
ject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would
be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the
property may arise because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence or mistake, or through a breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrong-
ful disposition of another's property. The basis of the constructive trust is the
unjust enrichment which would result if the person having the property were
permitted to retain it.
5 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS 3215 (3d ed. 1967).
210. E.g., Bean v. Wilson, 120 Cal. 2d 58, 260 P.2d 134 (1953). Note, however, that in
community property jurisdictions a putative spouse may recover for services rendered. E.g.,
Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 371 P.2d 329 (1962). The putative mar-
riage concept is a doctrine of de facto marriage, which is available in California, Louisiana,
and Texas. A putative marriage is marriage solemnized when one or both parties were igno-
rant of an impediment to the marriage that rendered it void or voidable. H. CLARK, LAW OF
DoMEsTic RELATIONS § 4.2 (1968). See, e.g., In re Foy's Estate, 109 Cal. App. 2d 329, 240
P.2d 685 (1952); Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So. 2d 502 (1949).
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gree. 211 The measure of the working spouse's recovery reflects not
the working spouse's interest in the asset obtained as a partial re-
sult of her efforts but rather the wholly independent basis of ser-
vices rendered to the student spouse.
A working spouse who seeks repayment under an equitable rem-
edy for putting his or her student spouse through school has a lim-
ited chance of success in most jurisdictions. Some equitable reme-
dies are not equally available in all jurisdictions; others are not
enforceable within the setting of marital litigation. In addition,
even if an equitable claim is successful, the plaintiff will collect
inadequate recompense for his or her contributions. 12
CONCLUSION
An advanced professional degree is a valuable asset. When two
parties contribute to the attainment of an asset, both ought to
have at least an equitable interest in that asset. Division of the
intangible asset represented by an educational degree or profes-
sional license, however, is difficult because of the personal charac-
ter of the property Courts deciding whether a professional degree
constitutes an asset, and valuing that asset, must resolve conflict-
ing social and economic policies. On the one hand, the working
spouse has made an irrevocable investment of time, money, and
effort in the student spouse's advanced educational degree with the
reasonable expectation that a substantial benefit would accrue to
the couple in future years. When divorce intervenes between the
investment and the accrual of a benefit, to deny the working
spouse a remedy is unjust. The injustice is compounded when the
basis of the denial is failure of the degree to satisfy the judicial
requirements of property. Courts, however, also must be sensitive
to the interests of the degreed spouse and avoid unduly burden-
some postdissolution demands on the student spouse in favor of
the working spouse.
Current decisions lack the explicit analysis and decisional guide-
lines necessary to aid the divorcing partners and domestic practi-
tioners to formulate a claim for an adequate remedy when the di-
vorcing partners have accumulated no conventional marital assets.
211. See notes 185-190 & accompanying text supra.
212. See note 207 & accompanying text supra.
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A limited, well defined rule that allows the trial court to consider
the greatly increased earning capacity of the student spouse as a
property asset capable of division upon divorce when division of
other, more conventional property assets will not benefit adquately
the working spouse is needed.
BETH H. LAMB
